The book discusses various maneuvers and the effect of terrain on the outcome of battles, and emphasizes the importance of gathering accurate information about the enemy's forces, dispositions and deployments, and movements. Sun Zi discusses the unpredictability of battle, the use of flexible strategies and tactics, the importance of deception and surprise, the close relationship between politics and military policy, and the high costs of war. The futility of seeking hard and fast rules and the subtle paradoxes of success are major themes. The best battle, Sun Zi says, is the battle that is won without being fought.
Six Requirements for Success in Modern Counterinsurgency Martin Myklebust and Tom Ordeman Abstract In recent counterinsurgency operations, Western military forces have been slow to adapt, and slow to adopt lessons learned in comparable prior conflicts.
By undertaking a detailed study of two such conflicts — the Algerian Revolution ofand the Dhofar Rebellion of — six overarching lessons for success and failure in COIN operations were revealed.
In the following essay, these lessons are detailed, informing recommendations for both policy-makers and warfighters engaged in future conflicts of these and other comparable types.
Introduction With the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies found themselves in possession of unparalleled conventional military prowess based on the combination of professional military forces and revolutionary advances in military technology.
As a result of Western military interventions in such theaters as Latin America GrenadaPanamathe Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa and the Balkans, forces opposed to the West have largely shifted their methods away from conventional warfare.
Unable to close with and defeat conventional forces on a traditional battlefield, state and sub-state actors have adopted both ground tactics and overall strategies increasingly reminiscent of such insurgencies as the Soviet-Afghan and Vietnam Wars. In recent years, asymmetric conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have proved challenging for Western forces whose doctrine and equipment have been carefully optimized for potential conflicts against other conventional armies, and whose societies have a low tolerance threshold for long, costly campaigns.
Of course, insurgency is an ancient method of engaging in the Clausewitzian clash of wills between one group or another.
From Rome's campaigns against the Celtic and Germanic tribes, to the imperial British operations during the Anglo-Afghan and Boer Wars, history is rife with examples of clashes between armies and insurgents.
Although such classic examples may provide lessons within the Clausewitzian "logic" of war, the fluid "grammar" [i] of warfare directs strategists to focus their examinations on modern counterinsurgency COIN campaigns - both successful and unsuccessful - to evaluate the critical elements a COIN force must employ in order to prosecute successful COIN campaigns.
With these factors in mind, this study consider on six major requirements for successful COIN operations in a modern context. Specific examples illustrating these six requirements derive from two specific case studies. As an example of success, the relatively neglected Dhofar Rebellion in Oman has been chosen.
While numerous COIN campaigns would have been relevant, the conflicts in question offered clear, distinct examples to illustrate the six critical requirements for modern COIN success. This analysis has been informed by a variety of classic and contemporary sources on the topic.
These included military doctrinal literature, academic sources on both insurgency and specific conflicts, and the writings of recognized insurgent and guerrilla leaders of the recent past.
Population-centric COIN, as espoused by such strategists as David Galula, David Kilcullen, and David Petraeus, involves fighting the insurgency not by focusing on killing insurgents themselves; but rather, by assisting the host nation government HNG in meeting the economic, security, and political needs of the population, thus denying the insurgent the popular support necessary to continue the insurgency.
Population-centric COIN encompasses the current COIN doctrine within Western militaries, while many non-Communist insurgent groups have adapted the Maoist system and, to a lesser degree, the Guevaran "Foco" theory to fit their own objectives.
Overview of Case Studies Byclose to a million of pieds-noirs ethnically Europeanslived in Algeria. A colony sinceAlgeria was by definition a part of France by As Algerian nationalism rose and increasing unrest among the population created tension, the pieds-noirs felt abandoned by the administration in Paris.
As the Algerian War was drawing to a close, another insurgency was arising in the southern Omani province of Dhofar. The conflict accelerated in when provocateurs from the neighboring communist state of South Yemen, armed and trained by Moscow and Beijing, played upon Dhofari discontent stemming from the reign of Sultan Said bin Taimur.
The resulting insurgency of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf and later, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman - known colloquially as the "adoo", Arabic for "enemy" - threatened to put the Strait of Hormuz and a strategic Western ally in the Soviet orbit - nine years before the unexpected Islamic Revolution in neighboring Iran would further jeopardize the key energy shipping lane.
The British intervened to help the heir, Sultan Qaboos, to depose his father, after which Omani forces - assisted by Britain, Imperial Iran, Jordan, and Pakistan - embarked upon a unified campaign of development, modernization, COIN, and reconciliation. Achieving these goals requires the host nation to defeat insurgents or render them irrelevant, uphold the rule of law, and provide a basic level of essential services and security for the populace.
HNGs that are seen as illegitimate, corrupt, or ineffective contribute to passive or active support for insurgents from among the local populace.
If the HNG is seen as legitimate, fair, and effective at addressing the basic needs and grievances of the populace, the insurgency will not receive the recruits, logistical support, and popular approval it needs to succeed.
A Host Nation Identity Crisis Contrary to Tunisia and Morocco, former French colonies which were granted sovereignty in March ofAlgeria was regarded by the French government and people as an integral department of France. Thus, instead of handling the challenges alongside a host nation, the policymakers approached the campaign as an internal governance issue within the French state.
There was, therefore, a disconnect between the French policymakers' perception of Algeria, and the contemporary concept of a "host nation" within the classical model of an intervention between states. The French had a certain situational awareness in relation to tendencies within the Algerian government, but not when considering political movements in the more critical rural areas; these became the heartland of the FLN.
The FLN defined its war, with its precision and skills, aimed at two fronts: The Algerian War came at a difficult time in French history.
Poor French administration of the country and its resources in the aftermath of defeat in Indochina resulted in grave effects on the war in Algeria. The French political and military establishments suffered in economic terms, as well as in public opinion and related force endurance, all of which are critical to success in COIN operations.
Owing to these factors, the French government chronically underfunded development and governance programs in Algeria and repeatedly failed to deliver on promises of economic and social reforms, further undermining French credibility among the pieds-noirs as well as the indigenous populace.
French efforts to pacify Algeria were further complicated by the ill-fated Anglo-French operation in the Suez Crisis. Despite numerous setbacks and missteps on their part, the FLN narrative became increasingly resonant among the indigenous population with every excess committed by French troops.
Eliminating Questions of Legitimacy Sultan Said bin Taimur was universally unpopular in Muscat and Oman, which were treated as two different political units. A great deal of the animosity among the Dhofaris and the rest of his subjects stemmed from his austere administration of the nation, combined with the particular marginalization of Dhofar in national affairs.
With British support, Sultan Qaboos deposed Sultan Said in in July ofeliminating the argument of regime illegitimacy.
Sultan Qaboos immediately established the unified Sultanate of Oman to eliminate the political distinction between the capital and the interior.Unconventional warfare includes psychological warfare, guerrilla warfare, espionage, chemical warfare, and terrorism.
The environment in which a war is fought has a significant impact on the type of combat which takes place, and can include within its area different types of terrain.
FROM MAKIN TO BOUGAINVILLE: Marine Raiders in the Pacific War. Marines in World War II Commemorative Series by Major Jon T Hoffman USMCR: The Browning air-cooledcaliber machine gun was the weapon of choice for raider battalions because of its low weight in comparison to other available machine guns.
Trove: Find and get Australian resources. Books, images, historic newspapers, maps, archives and more. Buddhism and responses to disability, mental disorders and deafness in Asia (and associated responses to disability, mental disorders or deafness), conceived and developed, and from which it became increasingly differentiated over centuries.
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To understand the evolution of the Indian army’s CI doctrine, one has to go back to its experience in Nagaland and Mizoram in the s and s. It is from here that the basics emerged based on actual operational experience. The doctrine, as it developed over a period of time, had four major components.